Rank:

SS-Hauptscharführer (Sergeant Major)

Unit:

München

Awarded on:

January 30th, 1938

Rank:

SS-Hauptscharführer (Sergeant Major)

Awarded on:

March 2nd, 1939

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Rank:

SS-Hauptscharführer (Sergeant Major)

Awarded on:

November 14th, 1939

Rank:

SS-Hauptscharführer (Sergeant Major)

Awarded on:

June 12th, 1940

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Rank:

SS-Hauptscharführer (Sergeant Major)

Unit:

1./ SS-Totenkopf-Inf. Rgt. 3

Awarded on:

July 6th, 1941

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Rank:

SS-Hauptscharführer (Sergeant Major)

Unit:

1. Kompanie, SS-Totenkopf-Jnfanterie-Regiment 3, SS-Totenkopf-Division

Awarded on:

August 28th, 1941

Awarded for a wound inflicted on the 23rd of August 1941.

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Rank:

SS-Untersturmführer der Reserve (2nd Lieutenant of Reserves)

Unit:

Zugführer, 1. Kompanie, SS-Totenkopf-Jnfanterie-Regiment 3, SS-Totenkopf-Division

Awarded on:

October 8th, 1941

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Rank:

SS-Hauptsturmführer der Reserve (Captain of Reserves)

Awarded on:

July 7th, 1944

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Rank:

SS-Hauptsturmführer der Reserve (Captain of Reserves)

Unit:

Kommandeur, SS-Schützen-Bataillon (motorisiert) 6, 6. SS-Gebirgs-Division "Nord"

Awarded on:

1944

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Rank:

SS-Hauptsturmführer der Reserve (Captain of Reserves)

Unit:

Kommandeur, SS-Schützen-Bataillon (motorisiert) 6, 6. SS-Gebirgs-Division "Nord", XVIII. Gebirgs-Armee-Korps, 20. Gebirgs-Armee

Awarded on:

August 12th, 1944

Renz’s Knight’s Cross recommendation reads as follows…

“I. Situation:

On the 25.06.1944 the enemy began an attack against the northern wing of the Division with the 205th and parts of the 83rd rifle divisions (with the 367th rifle division as a reserve). Their goal was to thrust into the deep flank of the Division, capture Kiestinki in an assault from north to south and in doing so cut off those elements of the XVIII. (Gebirgs) Armee-Korps that were positioned in the Louhi sector from their rearward connections.

After friendly formations in the corridor between the Kapanez and Ssenn lakes had withstood the onslaught of enemy forces attacking to the southwest, the SS-Schützen-Bataillon (mot) 6 (without its 1. Kompanie) under the leadership of SS-Hauptsturmführer Renz received new orders on the 29.06.1944. It was to first occupy the village of Ssennosero. Then, along with some elements being dispatched to the aforementioned corridor at Blue Point 301, they were to block the enemy attempts to get around the Ssenn lake along its northern bank. In doing so they would eliminate the possibility of the enemy thrusting into the rear of friendly forces in the Okunjewaguba area or to the area north of the Pja lake.

Battle strength - 11 officers, 410 NCOs and men.

II. Combat Report:

Setting out from strongpoint Hagen at 18:00 on the 29.06.1944, the Bataillon reached Ssennosero on the next day at 20:40 and took up position there. At 02:15 on the 01.07.1944 the Schi-Bataillon 82 (without its 1. Kompanie) under the command of Hauptmann Lapp entered Ssennosero. As the senior officer he assumed overall control of both Bataillone, which became ‘Gruppe Lapp’.

The recon units that SS-Hauptsturmführer Renz deployed before the arrival of Schi-Bataillon 82 encountered the enemy east, north and west of Ssennosero over the course of the day. After the enemy had recognized our forces and how they interfered with his aims, they brought up additional forces. As was later confirmed by prisoner statements, the 721st rifle regiment (from the 205th rifle division that was located south of the Ssenn lake) along with the ski battalions from 4 rifle divisions encircled our strongpoint, aiming to eliminate the Kampfgruppe.

During the subsequent and ongoing combat, in which the Kampfgruppe was cut off from all land connections and only receiving resupply by the air (and via water over the Ssenn lake starting on the 04.07.1944), Renz distinguished himself against an enemy that tried to eliminate our forces by any means necessary. He showed great personal bravery, decisiveness and readiness for action. Through his example he inspired his Bataillon to high achievements, and he continued to lead his unit for 4 days after being wounded.

The enemy attacks that began on the 01.07.1944 increased in terms of force disparity with each passing day. On the 05.07.1944 SS-Hauptsturmführer Renz succeeded in fending off a battalion sized enemy attack (supported by a smokescreen and heavy preparatory fire by artillery/mortars) through his superior leadership and personal actions in the foremost line.

After a battalion sized enemy attack in the morning hours of the 07.07.1944 had been defeated, they tried again in the afternoon of the same day following a heavy bombardment by artillery and mortars. They attacked with two battalions from the west this time, and sought to bring about a decisive result. During this assault they achieved two penetrations in the lines of SS-Schützen-Bataillon (mot) 6. Capitalizing on this achievement, they now simultaneously struck from the east and achieved another penetration in the sector of the Schi-Bataillon 82.

In this most desperate hour, one in which the enemy’s goal of totally destroying the Kampfgruppe was definitively within reach, SS-Hauptsturmführer Renz assembled the last troops of his Bataillon staff and about 40 men from his 3. Kompanie (which he personally fetched from their positions in the southeast) under enemy fire. He commenced a counterthrust with these men against the enemy that had by then made it as far as the Bataillon command post, and in an energetic attack he was able to throw them back to their starting positions. During this counterthrust SS-Hauptsturmführer Renz was wounded in both thighs by machine-pistol rounds.

His initiative and bravery before the enemy were invaluable factors that enabled the Kampfgruppe to escape the danger of being totally annihilated, despite being attacked from two sides and tied down by multiple penetrations.

Although his own mobility was completely inhibited by his wounds, Renz would continue to lead his Bataillon for another 4 days. In this time the Kampfgruppe continued to repel attacks of the enemy. Only after all the Bataillon’s wounded had been evacuated over the water passage, and a new leader for the Bataillon had been brought up, did Renz relinquish command of his Bataillon per the orders of the Division.

III. Conclusion and Justification for the Recommendation of the Knight’s Cross:

1. Through the reconnaissance that he dispatched immediately after reaching Ssennosero, SS-Hauptsturmführer Renz realized that his objective of dispatching troops to the corridor at Blue Point 301 could no longer be carried out without compromising his primary task. For this reason he decided to defend Ssennosero with all his available forces before the appropriate divisional order and the arrival of the Schi-Bataillon 82.

2. The steadfastness of SS-Schützen-Bataillon (mot) 6 and its commander, SS-Hauptsturmführer Renz, enabled the leader of the Kampfgruppe, Hauptmann Lapp, to conduct his main task of leading the defense of the entire village.

3. If the enemy had consolidated the gains they made on the 07.07.1944 up to the Bataillon command post, Gruppe Lapp would have been cut off from the water resupply route across the Ssenn lake (in use since the 04.07.1944), and the continuation of viable aerial resupply drops would have been unlikely. Thus, through the counterthrust that he launched on his own initiative and with exemplary bravery, Renz created the groundwork for the continued resistance of Gruppe Lapp until it was relieved on the 16.07.1944.

These three facts were crucial for the defense Ssennosero. The loss of the village and the area around it would have permitted the enemy to…

a) thrust to the south and tie down further forces of the Division by a thrust into its deep flank. These forces would only have been freed up by further weakening the frontline.

b) thrust to the west, enter the area north of the Pja lake without a fight, and from there reach the road leading to Kuusamo (in the Armee’s rear area) after brushing aside the weak Finnish security force present (a Luftschutz-Kompanie).

Thus, because of his high personal bravery, bitter resistance (that saw him being wounded while in command of his Bataillon) and inherent decisiveness, SS-Hauptsturmführer Renz averted a danger for the entire XVIII. (Gebirgs) Armee-Korps, one which would have been forced the Korps to pull back its front sooner or later.”