Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Rank:

Rittmeister der Reserve

Unit:

Chef 3. / Panzerjäger-Abteilung 258

Awarded on:

April 6th, 1943

On the morning of the 25.02.1943 the Soviets launched an attack against the villages of Sassadskij and Nikitenka. The attacking forces consisted of the Soviet 202nd Tank Brigade as well as two rifle battalions. Among the defending German troops was Hauptmann Holz, and he describes the fighting which took place as follows…

“My Kompanie was attached to the III./479. The Bataillon had one Kompanie stationed in both Sassadskij and in Nikitenka. The remainder of the unit (including the Bataillon command post and the Panzerjäger-Kompanie) was in Werch Grankina. Also located here were a few infantry guns that had been posted there by the Regiment for the Bataillon’s use.

The terrain was dominated by the broad Belyi—Nemed valley and its neighbouring ravines. The villages lay atop the upper edges of these ravines, which turned into swampy meadows in the summer. The villages were connected by paths that included bridges over the creeks. As such tankers would need to stick to these existing paths and bridges when trying to cross the valleys.

This terrain allowed my guns to be deploying from both flanking and covered positions. However the Kompanie only had two powerful guns at its disposal, one 7.5-cm Pak and one 5-cm Pak. The 7.5-cm Pak was at the western entrance of Nikitenka and dominated the ravines from the flank. The 5-cm Pak was located more in-depth at the southwest entrance of Werch Grankina. There were also still six 3.7-cm Pak that were distributed along the village edges in mutually supporting positions.

On the morning of the 25.02.1943 heard loud motor noises, and then tanks came down from the hill. 12 tanks in a line, this time English Mark IIs. One of the tanks peeled off before reaching the ravine and drove along the village edge of Nikitenka. The 7.5-cm Pak had apparently not gotten a line of sight to the other tanks. This prompted the Zugführer to change his position (despite explicit orders to the contrary) in order to attack the one tank. He probably thought that the others would follow him. But bad luck was not long in coming. The Pak’s great weight caused one of its wheels to slip into a hole that had been concealed under the snow, and it was no longer movable. Overzealousness thus caused our best cannon to be out of action for the entire remainder of the battle without having even fired one shot.

The enemy left Nikitenka completely unscathed. All of their tanks drove past the village’s western edge and onto the bridge to Sassadskij. The lead tank drove on one of the few mines that we had been able to lay before the bridge. But the Russian commander transferred to the next tank and then continued to drive on. If the 7.5-cm Pak was still in it’s previous position then it would have been able to destroy the enemy tanks one by one from a range of 100 metres. Instead the tanks quickly crossed over the creek and meadow and drove along the path to Sassadskij. The two light Pak bravely opened fire, but even from this range and with flanking fire they were unable to achieve any effect with their 3.7-cm calibre guns. The guns were knocked out, and those men that survived pulled back.

Five tanks turned to the right and soon reached the elevated village edge of Werch Grankina. The remainder drove to the left and began to clear out the western part of Sassadskij. The Russians utilized this moment to send their infantry into the village from the west.

Here I have to commemorate the actions of a man who had already caused a few difficulties for the Abteilung. He was a very quiet soldier, an Oberbannführer of the Hitlerjugend and one who had been directly sent to the front in order to quickly become an officer. He had nothing in common with an official of the Nazi regime, instead he was always humble and tried to be a good comrade. His only problem was that he was not the least bit suitable to be an officer, or even an NCO. A request soon came from Berlin to the Abteilung, asking why this man had not yet become an officer. The Kompanie commander often spoke with him. He spontaneously said ‘Herr Hauptmann, please ensure that I do not become an officer. I like being a soldier, but I couldn’t even command a gun. I am a bookworm and have no practical sense; I would be a catastrophe as a soldier.’

The Abteilung responded accordingly, and the commander did not make him an officer. The answer of the HJ leadership in Berlin showed no understanding, being full of threats and rudeness. This man was deployed with one of the 3.7-cm Pak. His gun was destroyed, and a few of his comrades fell. He remained in position and shot every Russian he could see until he was crushed by a tank track.

The first of the five tanks that had driven up opposite Werch Grankina now set into motion. He came down the serpentine road, crossed the bridge and turned onto the village road of Werch Grankina. At this moment he came into view of the 5-cm Pak. This gun fired 4-5 armour-piercing rounds. All of these hit, but none broke through the strong armour. The monster came ever closer. It came within a distance of 50 metres, then the tank commandant made a mistake. He turned to the right and stopped. In the next moment the tank received a direct hit in the rear of its turret, it exploded and stood in flames. Only one man bailed out, throwing himself into the snow and immediately opening fire with his MP; in the next moment he was hit with an MG burst.

The situation remained unchanged with the other four tanks. The infantry guns had taken them under fire, but to no effect. A few Russians were spotted amongst the tanks. They had probably dismounted in order to better observe the course of their now defeated comrade’s battle. Strong infantry forces had not yet followed them. However it was to be expected that they would break through our defenses in the direction of Lawrowo. The Panzerjäger-Kompanie commander thus judged the moment to be right to try to take them on in close combat. This could be achieved as long as one quickly crossed the creek bottom and got in under the fire of the tank cannons. He gathered up a good dozen Panzerjäger troops. Unfortunately there were only a few close combat weapons to be had: Teller mines, a magnetic AT mine and a few hand grenades were all that was available. The Panzerfaust had not yet arrived on the eastern front. A quick conversation with the Bataillon commander, Oberleutnant Rutzen, secured the employment of the infantry guns to provide covering fire for the planned maneuver. Before the last round of the infantry guns was fired, the Panzerjäger broke out of cover with cries of ‘Hurra’ and stormed towards the creek. Only one man was wounded. Then, with some difficulty, we hurried up the deep snow-covered steep slope. The close combat was to be carried out by the Kompanie commander, his Kompanie HQ squad leader (Oberfeldwebel Jokisch) and Obergefreiter Prieb. The remainder of the assault troop would give covering fire and try to secure a portion of the terrain.”

After climbing up the slope Holz saw three Russian soldiers with sub-machine guns in a hollow immediately in front of him; they were quickly taken out with a hand grenade. Then the three tanks located just a few metres away were attacked. Oberfeldwebel Jokisch takes up the narrative here, describing what happened next as follows…

“The first tank had either bogged down in a hollow or taken damage to its tracks; either way it was unable to move forwards or backwards and was constantly slipping to the rear. We jumped onto it with a cry of ‘Hurra’, and could hear the crew inside talking. We demanded that they surrender, but instead they continued to try and drive back and forth. We clung onto the icy metal. Prieb took the magnetic AT mine and set it on the turret. I wanted to see how it would work. They had told us in an anti-tank combat course that the metal would burst into the interior. The pressure wave of the detonation caused me to fall to the rear, but I was unhurt. The tank was immobilized, its crew out of action.

The next tank was likewise in a depression. But he has unable to drive forwards or backwards in the smooth ground, and now the commander jumped onto the tank. He tore open the hatch and shot inside, a sight that one won’t forget. Onto the next one. A hand grenade whizzed out of the tank turret and fell right in front of me atop of the snow, but thankfully it did not detonate. The ignition strike apparently malfunctioned in the deep snow. The fate of this third tank was also sealed with a Teller mine.

The fourth tank was somewhat off to the side. Approaching this one would be very difficult due to the open snowfields that would need to be crossed. Then we heard tank noises behind us. We initially thought it was more Russian armour, but it was actually a German Panzer that had been requested for. It destroyed the last Mark II. We had achieved our objective. These enemy tanks would not penetrate into the depth of our defense. Unfortunately we also took some losses, the most painful of which was our Kompanie commander becoming badly wounded. We brought him to the main dressing station on a sled.”

After the tanks were destroyed (the ones that had broken into Sassadskij were destroyed by the neighbouring unit), the village was cleared of Soviet infantry in a counterthrust by the Bataillon reserve. Contact was eventually restored with the neighbouring unit.

The Soviets ultimately lost 300 dead, 23 prisoners and numerous weapons in addition to their Matilda Mark II tanks. Holz would be awarded the Knight’s Cross for fearlessly taking on his group of Soviet tanks in close combat.

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

May 12th, 1945

Mentioning in Soldbuch.

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)