WO 171/456 - 11 Armoured Division - July 1944

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Vol. 1. and the Staff Manual respectively Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.	WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY	Army Form C.2118
	WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY	Unit: HQ 11 Armoured Division
Month and Year: July 1944	(Erase heading not required).	Commanding Officer: Major-Gen. G.P.B. Roberts DSO, MC

Place	Date	Hour	Summary	Reference
Normandy	1		Sitrep 1200 hrs	1A
	1		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.13 (Copy No.48)	1B
	1		Day's events	1C
	2		List of place code names	1D
	2		Sitrep 1800 hrs	1E
	2		Day's events	1F
	3		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.14 (Copy No.47)	1G
	3		Day's events	1H
	3		11 Armd Div Standing Orders Amendment No.5	1J
	4		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.15 (Copy No.41)	1K
	4		Day's events	1L
	5		Sitrep 1145 hrs	1M
	5		Sitrep 2200 hrs	1N
	5		Sitrep 2230 hrs	1O
	5		11 Armd Div Op Instr No.3 (Copy No.19)	1P
	5		Day's events	1Q
	6		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.16 (Copy No.41)	1R
	6		Day's events	1S
	6		Sitrep 2200 hrs	1T
Normandy	7		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.17	1U
	7		11 Armd Div OO No.2 (Copy No.50)	1V
	7		11 Armd Div Gen Instrs No.10	1W
	7		Day's events	1X
	8		Sitrep 0100 hrs	1Y
	8		Place code names period 9-15 Jul	1Z
	8		Sitrep 1115 hrs	2A
	8		Sitrep 1345 hrs	2B
	8		159 Inf Bde report on methods used to defeat German Tactics etc	2C
	9		Sitrep 0045 hrs	2D
	9		Sitrep 1500 hrs	2E
	9		11 Armd Div General Instruction No.12	2F
	9		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.18 (Copy No.41)	2G
	9		Sitrep 2350 hrs	2H
	10		Sitrep 2340 hrs	2J
	10		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.19 (Copy No.42)	2K
	11		Sitrep 2345 hrs	2L
	11		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.20 (Copy No.43)	2M
	12		Change of Command	2N
	12		Sitrep 2350 hrs	2O
Normandy	13		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.21 (Copy No.42)	2P
	14		Sitrep 0110 hrs	2Q
	15		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.22 (Copy No.39)	2R
	16		11 Armd Div OO No.3 Copy No.46 and Amendment No.1	2S
	13-17		Days events	2T
	17		Sitrep giving gen situation	2U
	18		Day's events	2V
	19		Sitrep 0230 hrs	2X
	19		Sitrep 1444 hrs	2Y
	19		Sitrep 2200 hrs	2Z
	19		Sitrep 2359 hrs	3A
	19		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.23 Copy No.44	3B
	19		Day's events	3C
	20		Sitrep 0820 hrs	3D
	20		Sitrep No.049	3E
	20		GOC's message	3F
	20		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.24 Copy No.46	3G
	20		Days events	3H
Normandy	21		Sitrep 1325 hrs	3J
	21		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.25 (Copy No.48)	3K
	21		11 Armd Div Mov OrderNo.1	3L
	21		Day's events	3M
	22		Sitrep 2359 hrs	3N
	22		Day's events	3O
	23		Sitrep 1255 hrs	3P
	23		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.26 Copy No.50	3Q
	23		Tank and crew cas for ops 18 and 19 Jul	3R
	24		Lessons from battle SE of CAEN 18-21 Jul from 159 Inf Bde	3S
	24		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.27 Copy No.51	3T
	24		Sitrep 2359 hrs	3U
	25		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.28 Copy No.55	3V
	25		Sitrep 1115 hrs (come under command 12 Corps)	3W
	25		Sitrep 2330 hrs	3X
	26		Sitrep 1300 hrs	3Y
	26		11 Armd Div Int Summary No.29 Copy No.56	3Z
	27		11 Armd Div Op Instr No.4 Copy No.14	4A
France	29		On July 29, the division moved across the Second Army bridgehead via BAYEUX. This proved a long and tedious process for the roads in that constricted area were packed with traffic of all sorts which no movement instruction however careful or authoritative seemed capable of clearing.
	29	2200	By nightfall our forces were concentrated between BALLEROY and CAUMONT, the front-line town of the sector recently captured by the Americans.
	29		For the advance which was to start at 0700 hrs on the next day fresh brigade groupings were adopted. The experience of 7 Armoured Division and the Americans in the bocage country had demonstrated the necessity for the closest co-operation of tanks and infantry. In this region of thick woods and narrow roads winding between impassable hedges and ditches, num[...] local engagements were anti[...] and under these conditions reasonable progress could be assured by the infantry moving with the tanks on all routes and often actually riding on them.	Appendix No.1
France	29		The division therefore moved in Brigade Groups; 29 Armoured Brigade Group on the left consisting of two of their armoured regiments (23 H and 3 RTR) the motor battalion (8 RB) and one infantry battalion from 159 (3 MON); and 159 Infantry Brigade Group on the right with their remaining two units (4 KSLI and 1 Hereford), one armoured regiment (2 FF Yeo) and the armoured recce regiment (2 N Yeo) now as usual employed as a normal tank unit.
	30		On the left where the advance coincided with that of 15 (S) Division, little or no enemy opposition was actually encountered; but the difficult nature of the country and the bad condition of the roads made progress slow. Woods […] the road had to be investigated as the recent […] of the enemy was displayed by the number of mines which were met.
	30	2200	This route let from LE VALLEE just south-west of CAUMONT to skirt SEPT VENTS, thence just to the east of […] and so down to ST MARTIN DES BESACES. By last light the leading troops were about a mile to the south-west of […].
	30	1800	Meanwhile on the right where we were flanked by 5 […] Infantry Division strong enemy resistence developed at CUSSY and in the surrounding woods. One of the battalions of 159 Infantry Brigade Group (1 Hereford) had to fight a stiff battle before this could be overcome. This operation occupied most of the day and cost the battalion fairly heavy casualties especially to one company. CUSSY was eventually cleared by 1800 hrs and the other infantry battalion (4 KSLI) together with one armoured regimetn (2 FF Yeo) pushed on to capture LA BAISSELIERE.
	30		Opposition was everywhere stubborn and several tanks were lost on mines. On the whole progress had been satisfactory and compared favourably – perhaps rather too fabrouably – with that made by the troops on our right and left. Effective use was made of supporting aircraft through-out the day.
	30		From now on it may confidently be asserted that the division considered its role as an independent advance rather than simply the protection of a flank. The enemy position was based on the FORET L'EVEQUE and the east and west road through ST MARTIN DES BESACES, and it was considered that we were best placed to break through this line and push south to next commanding position – the high ground east and west of LE BENY BOCAGE. So we were first to capture the important road junction of ST MARTIN itself and hand it over to 15 (S) Division then to try and find a way round or through the FORET L'EVEQUE. Instead of protection somebody else's flank, it was now hoped that someone woudl protect our own. Once again the division was sticking its neck out but this time conditions were different. The close country of which we had once been so apprehensive proved far more friendly to our tanks than the open expanses of the CAEN plain. Above all it was felt that the enemy who was now showing signs of cracking in the west might here too be overthrown by a sudden coup and an important victory might be won.
	30	2300	That night 2 WG came under command and took over our right flank protection from 2 N Yeo for one day only.	Appendix No.2
France	31		The advance towards the ST MARTIN road continued by night.By early morning 29 Brigade Group had bumped fairly stiff opposition and 159 Brigade Group were the first to reach the main road. An attack on ST MARTIN thus became possible from two directions with 29 holding from the North and 159 moving on the place from the west.	Appendix No.3
	31	1100	The village was entered by 1100 hrs (31 July) but the importance of its capture was soon forgotten in the excitement over a piece of news at 1030 hrs.
	31		At this time there were two armoured car regiments under the division's command and one of these (2 HCR) patrolling in front of 159 Brigade Group had found a track through the FORET L'EVEQUE which was neither blocked by mines nor held by the enemy. This track evidently formed the boundary between two enemy divisions, 3 Para and 326 Infantry and apparently the enemy omitted to make it inclusive to either formation or the formation responsible had omitted to guard it. This theory was confirmed subsequently by a radio intercept which presented the route in question as a subject of dispute between the two German commanders concerned.
	31		Down this track therefore, had gone a troop of armoured cars and emerging from the forest, they discovered that the bridge over the River Ondeleure on the main road from MONT BERTROND to LE BENY BOCAGE was also unprotected and promptly seized it. Two hours later they were joined by a troop of tanks from 2 N Yeo who had made their way through the forest only after overcoming the opposition of two German SP guns. This force held the vital bridge for the next six hours by which time it had been decided to push the entire division over it and the leading tanks of 29 Brigade Group had arrived on this mission.
France	31		The capture of this bridge and the advance southward which it made possible was unquestionably a turning-point in the campaign in France. The battle beyond CAEN had obstructed the collection of a counter-attack force sufficient to halt the American drive further west. This advance prevented the immediate reinforcement of that force. In order that the coup might be exploited the Army plan was changed and its most westerly troops now became officially the main striking force. The commanding heights around LE BENY BOCAGE, originally the objective not even of 15 (S) Div but of 30 Corps now lay within our grasp: and we were ordered after securing them to push on with all speed to ETOUVY (6338).

previous month

Source: Jeroen Koppes, TracesOfWar.com.

Disclaimer: This War Diary is based on its original, but typos might be corrected. Locations are calculated, so might not be in the correct place. For historical research, always check the originals.

Domains

More information

Contact