WO 171/1384 - 2 Royal Ulster Regiment - September 1944

Instructions regarding War Diaries and Intelligence Summaries are contained in F.S. Regs., Vol. 1. and the Staff Manual respectively Title pages will be prepared in manuscript.	WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY	Army Form C.2118
	WAR DIARY or INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY	Unit: 2nd Bn The Royal Ulster Rifles
Month and Year: September 1944	(Erase heading not required).	Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. I.C. Harris

Place	Date	Hour	Summary	Reference
	19		From 7 - 15 to 7 plus 15 a concentration of three divisional artilleries was put down on selected targets on a far side of the canal.The last few minutes of this barrage gave some trouble to B Coy who reported some "shorts" but although these harassed launching operations no casualties were sustained and launching went forward without cease. By 0055hrs both Coys were able to report a small bridgehead secured and their first objectives gained. Half an hour later B Coy had taken its first two prisoners and C Coy had reported its second objective taken and a section of the Carrier Platoon in position covering the left or open flank of the Coy. Opposition had so far be light, giving the impression that this landing had achieved a fair element ofessential suprise. At 0205Hrs we heard from 2 Lincson our right that they had three Coys across but were held up from their left flank by fire which was coming from buildings within our area. At the same time C Coy reported that a countter attack was coming in from the left rear. Machine gun fire was coming from the tow path at 150yds range and the enemy closed the range to a distance from which he couldthrow hand grenades.C Coy with the Carrier sections under command produced a vigorous and a swiftly reply to this menace. The strenght of this counter attack was afterwards estimated to be a strong fighting patrol of at least 25 - 30 men, though that manymore were wounded. On our own side, C Coy HQ had suffered, Capt. Laving, the second in command being killed and two men being wounded. Soon after this attack the Commanding Officer decided to send over D Coy to substantiate C Coy left flank and not to advance to its original objective until daylight. This was achieved without casualtiesand by 400hrs D Coy was able to report itself in position. Meanwhile a most promising situation was developing on the right. B Coy had made the crossing unscathed, although a hail of machine gun fire had cut the water close to the boats which werre carrying the final platoon , and number of 8.1 cm Mortar shells fell dangerously near the Coy as it moved forward towards its objective. This was a pathway about 200yds inland and it was reached safely with Boche machine guns firing high and wide and mortar shells still dropping close by. Then the Coy struck across country directly was maintained by a compass bearing and thereby the Coy found its objective ans established itself upon it. Recce patrols were immediately sent north to the railway and south of the village. Both soon returned with confirmation that the Boche was in both places in some strenght. At the same time B Coy began to gather in the fruits of the position built up astride the enemy line of retreat. The first party to be taken was three from a medical section who were evacuating some casualties. They were astonished at being captured here, and could not believe that the were cut off from the rear. At this stage Capt. Gaffikin spoke to the Commanding Officer over the 18 set explaining the position. He pointed out that B Coy by itself could not clear the village because with enemy in strenght both to north and the south a firm base of the entire coy strenght was essential to retain its present commanding position. But the village had to be cleared and cleared swiftly, since enemy machine guns from there covered the site selected for the class 40 bridge, and the nature and direction of Capt. Gaffikin's advance had made it possible to attack the village from the north instead of incurring heavy casualties which a frontal or flank attack would have caused. At 0345hrs on the oreder of the Commanding Officer A Coy crossed the canal. One casualty was sustained by mortar fire but no accurate fire was brought down to hinder. Guides from B Coy were met at the other side and they guided major Sweeney MC OC A coy, his Coy to B's position. The two Coy Comds quicly conferred and deceided that A Coy should cear the village while B Coy remained firm based upon its objective. It was 0530hrs before Lt. Betty, in command of A Coy's leading platoon, began to move towards the village: the light had begun to break though it was obscured by the same ground mist that has risen the night before. Straight away five Germans emerged from a ditch and ten more came out of the first house taken taken on by the platoon, though in this case only after a lively exchange of fire. This position was hardly in hand before the sound of horse drawn transport was heard approching from the direction of the vilage . Suddenly two cart loads of Germans, with a varied assortiment of weapons and foo] appeared, and they were promptly engaged by Lt. Betty's platoon at short range. The enemy displayed the agility of desperation and brought his weapons into action with remarkable speed. A brief fire fight took place our men soon made their superiority felt; and the result was clinched by a hand grenade from the PL Sjt. Peel, witch finally caused the surrender of the party. The rest of the village was combed and about ten more prisoners were produced. Among the last party was a sapperof 3 Div who had been captured the precious evening of reconaissance, e was able to describethe bewilderment of the Germans in the village when they discovered that their escape route was cut off.

Source: Jeroen Koppes, TracesOfWar.com, transcribing: Theo Vervoort.

Disclaimer: This War Diary is based on its original, but typos might be corrected. Locations are calculated, so might not be in the correct place. For historical research, always check the originals.

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