- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Rank:
- Oberleutnant (1st Lieutenant)
- Unit:
- Chef 2. / Infanterie-Regiment 51 (motorisiert)
- Awarded on:
- October 27th, 1939
Here follows an excerpt from an article written by H. Nolte that describes why both Steinhardt and Stolz were awarded the Knight’s Cross…
“The Coup-de-main against Fort Two:
… To this end the Division received the mission of capturing Fort Two on the 26.09.1939, before the beginning of the general offensive. By doing so it would improve the jump-off positions for this later offensive. The units assigned for this task were the Regiment 51 (Liegnitz und Bunzlau, Oberst Bohnstedt), the ‘Couleurabteilung’ II./A.R. 18 (Major von Below) and Pioniere from the Bataillon 18 (Oberstleutnant Schmeling). On the 25.09.1939 a patrol led by Unteroffizier Kittner (51) and accompanied by a forward observer (Leutnant Schmelzer) from the 6./A.R. 18 (commanded by Oberleutant Schneller) managed to reach the broad, water-filled ditch in front of the Fort without enemy interference. It appeared that the Fort was only weakly occupied, something that appeared to be confirmed by the statements of a captured Polish officer.
The commander of the I./51 (Oberstleutnant Hemmann) was likewise able to reach the water ditch without enemy fire while conducting a personal reconnaissance. The Regiment thus decided to launch a surprise attack, without artillery preparation.
The 2./51 (Oberleutnant Steinhardt), reinforced by an MG-Zug and mortars from the 4./51 as well as a Zug of 18-er Pioniere, was to assault and capture the Fort’s southwestern edge under the covering fire of the II./A.R. 18. Under cover of darkness this unit managed to approach the position and overcome the approximately kilometre wide glacis without enemy fire. The advance proceeded up to the road that ran along the Fort’s southern edge.
The first shots rang out as the foremost Infanterie (Feldwebel Hahn) and Pionier (Leutnant Kroll) Züge began to cross the wall in the foremost of three barbed wire obstacles. This fire quickly increased from both the approximately eight metre high wall as well as the entrenched enemy riflemen.
It was already apparent that the garrison was far stronger than assumed. However the Pioniere and infantrymen continued to work their way forwards to the trenches. But the enemy fire continued to increase, and both Züge were forced to pull back into the road ditches due to heavy losses. Feldwebel Hahn fell just before reaching the wall ditch. Medic Ulbig tried together with Unteroffizieren Niederstrasser and Popp to bring him back, but both Ulbig and Niederstrasser were likewise hit. Only Popp managed to crawl back unwounded.
Meanwhile the follow-up Zug of the 2./51 (Oberfeldwebel Mücke) reached the area southeast of the Fort as per its mission. But here it also game under effective MG fire from the garrison, resulting in it having to pull back to the east. Since any continuation of the attack against this southwestern corner appeared futile (especially since the ditch there was 30 metres wide), the Kompanie commander made the decision to strike from the southeast and penetrate through the southernmost of the two fortress gates. Hahn’s Zug would meanwhile continue to tie down the enemy.
First off, the southeastern lying group of houses had to be cleared of the enemy. Mücke’s Zug had already entered into this area while meeting strong resistance. In order to quickly achieve success there, Steinhardt deployed his reserve Zug (commanded by Leutnant Nicht) against this area. Support was provided by the artillery and a machine-gun half Zug commanded by Oberleutnant Graf Henckel (from Donnersmarck).
Despite being hindered by ground fog, the Poles defended themselves bitterly and Donnersmarck was badly wounded. After this group of houses was captured, Leutnant Schmelzer set up an observation post in a particularly suitable house on the edge of the grouping that was only about 500 metres from the southeastern part of the Fort. The Kompanie subordinated a rifle squad to him.
Further to the left the Bataillon had allocated its 3. Kompanie (Oberleutnant Hildebrandt) to the area north of the Fort in order to prevent enemy intervention from there. The southern wing received strong fire as it entered into the wire obstacle, particularly from the walls. However mortars from the 4./51 were able to provide effective fire support and enable the Kompanie to continue its attack. It eventually secured a road fork northeast of the Fort. Feldwebel Fuchs fell in the process.
Oberleutnant Steinhardt realized that he and his Kompanie alone would not be able to capture the Fort. He requested reinforcements. The 1./51 (Leutnant Suckert) now had the task of ejecting the enemy in the bushy area on this side of the wall ditch and opening the path to the bridge before the southeastern gate (which was located between the Fort and housing group). As day broke the Kompanie managed to overwhelm the glacis and the three wire obstacles despite the heavy enemy fire, in no small part thanks to the covering fire of the II./A.R. 18. But then it was brought to a halt. The Kompanie commander was wounded.
The now thoroughly intermingled infantrymen and Pioniere were only able to approach the bridge while engaging in bitter close combat, jumping from one resistance nest to the next. Even when a lane of approach was secured, the lead forces were no longer capable of completing the final attack due to their diminished strength. The commander then deployed his subordinated 10./51 (Leutnant Stolz) for the attack. It was to pass through the approach lane secured by 1. and 2. Kompanien and enter into the Fort itself.
The tenth was effectively supported by the artillery, and it managed to approach the southwestern corner of the Fort via the glacis and then reach the southeastern corner along the wall ditch, all without casualties. They captured an anti-tank gun at the southeastern corner. Leutnant Stolz turned around and swiftly pushed forward along the trench to the bridge. After he had overpowered a Polish MG he brought the captured anti-tank gun into position at the bridge with the help of his comrades. It was aimed in the direction of the gate and casemates behind the wall ditch.
Unteroffizier Scheel, the Kompanie clerk (!), served as the loader. The Leutnant fired shell after shell against the embrasures and into the casemates. The advance of the tenth then made contact with the other Kompanien and the Pioniere. They stormed over the bridge in assault parties, blew up the gate and thrust into the inner courtyard.
Bitter close combat erupted, as only some Poles surrendered. Many who had not been probably disarmed later resumed the combat by surprise. The casemates had to be cleared out one-by-one until Fort Two was firmly in the hands of the Regiment.
As the infantry battle raged from strongpoint to strongpoint, and the men and leadership alike were fully engaged, the enemy counterattacked from the southeast. Their aim was to recapture both the housing group as well as the Fort itself. This counterattack encountered the defending friendly troops along the village edge, and above all the observation post of Leutnant Schmelzer.
The attack was beaten off: Observed fire was employed first. Then, as anti-tank guns or mortars pummelled the house, this transitioned to blocking fire. The combined firepower of the II./A.R. 18 and the rifles of the Leutnant and both radio operators were enough to win the day.
Alerted by the unexpected combat noise in his rear, Oberleutnant Steinhardt rushed to his eastern flank in order to simply find out who had brought down the artillery at the last minute and therefore denied the enemy their victory! From this point henceforth, Steinhardt and Schmelzer would be ‘brothers-in-arms’ in the truest sense of the word!
73 prisoners, an anti-tank gun, numerous MGs and small arms as well as abundant ammunition was captured. But far more important was the storming of Fort Two itself. The Polish losses in the Fort alone were estimated at about 60 dead soldiers, who had fought bravely and grimly despite the hopeless situation. But friendly losses were also noteworthy: 30 dead (including 4 NCOs) and 36 wounded.
The brave infantrymen, artillerymen and Pionieren all had a role in this success. But the lion’s share went to two soldiers in particular. One was Leutnant Stolz, who disregarded the strong enemy fire while personally serving as the gunner of the captured anti-tank gun. He inspired his men forwards, across the bridge and into the fort itself through the effects of both his gunfire and the personal example he set. Oberleutnant Steinhardt, also from the 51st, likewise led his men through the hotspots of the fierce combat with prudence and fearlessness.
Also worthy of honourable mention was Leutnant Schmelzer, a fact made clear from his attentiveness, decisiveness and staying power in this battle. Aside from rendering effective artillery support during the attack, he also prevented a dangerous sally from the rear and thereby secured our victory.
On this same day (26.09.1939) the Regensburger 10. Division captured Fort Mokotowski, located south of Warsaw. The result was that these two important keystones of the inner fortified defensive line had fallen: On the next morning the city capitulated!
The two officers of the 51st, Oberleutnant Steinhardt and Leutnant Stolz, received the Knight’s Cross as the first soldiers of the Wehrmacht to be so honoured. A memorable event for the entire Division! Furthermore, Leutnant Schmelzer was awarded the Iron Cross First Class as the first artilleryman of the Heer to be so honoured….”