Lüttwitz’s Swords’ recommendation reads as follows…
“The XXXXVII. Panzer-Korps, under the command of General der Panzertruppe Freiherr von Lüttwitz, had a major share in the great winter battle in the west in December 1944 & January 1945. After a tactical breakthrough of the enemy positions was achieved through the swift capture of the Our and Clerf river crossings, General Freiherr von Lüttwitz ordered his subordinated Divisionen to immediately push on to Bastogne. The attacking spearheads succeeded in overcoming both great terrain difficulties and the resistance of a bitterly defending foe, and they were able to advance to a point just east of this crucial road and railway junction.
However by now they enemy had assembled strong tank reserves north of Bastogne in the Noville area. Their goal was to use these forces to intercept our own armoured thrust towards the west. General Freiherr von Lüttwitz clearly recognized that the continued advance of his forces near Bastogne were in danger from this new flank threat, and so on the 20.12.1944 he decided to shift the point of main effort and eliminate the enemy resistance at Noville by sending in the armoured group of the 2. Panzer-Division. Undeterred by the heavy enemy fire, he personally took over command of the fighting in this area until victory was secured. His attacking forces were inspired by their commander’s personal example, and after a short while they were able to crush the enemy resistance here and force a breakthrough towards the west. On the same day elements of the 2. Panzer-Division managed to bypass Bastogne to the north and continue the forward march with armoured spearheads.
Later on it was discovered that the enemy had created a strong new defensive front at Marche with freshly arrived forces. The result was that a further advance towards the northwest was initially not possible. General Freiherr von Lüttwitz therefore decided to leave behind weak security elements and instead pivot towards the southwest with the bulk of the Kampfgruppe. His plan was to strike through Rochefort and then on towards Dinant. The weak enemy forces at Rochefort were overrun, and in the following days it was possible to push forwards to about 10 km east of Dinant. This success would not have been possible without the energetic, flexible leadership of General Freiherr von Lüttwitz. Out of all the units that participated in the great winter battle it was the XXXXVII. Panzer-Korps which advanced farthest to the west. However this operational achievement could not be properly utilized. The units of the left and right neighbouring formations had trailed behind, and soon there was a strong danger on the flanks from hastily brought-up enemy tank divisions. A defensive posture was adopted as per orders. Following heavy combat the foremost elements of the narrow salient were forced to pull back to a shorter line.
In the time period 16.12.1944-19.01.1945 the enemy suffered extremely heavy losses in the sector of the XXXXVII. Panzer-Korps, including the following destroyed or captured:
4041 prisoners
620 tanks
8 assault guns
333 armoured vehicles
433 unarmoured vehicles
52 artillery pieces
56 anti-tank guns
21 mortars.
3 large ammunition dumps also fell into our hands.
General Freiherr von Lüttwitz went on to further distinguish himself through his decisive leadership and inspiring personal example during the heavy defensive fighting around Cleve and west of Wesel. Although the enemy deployed large numbers of tank and infantry formations in an attempt to secure a breakthrough here, their attempts came to naught through a combination of multiple costly engagements and furiously conducted counterthrusts. Despite their superiority the enemy was only able to win ground slowly, and in the end they failed to either achieve a decisive breakthrough or shatter the Korps’ frontline. Throughout this time General Freiherr von Lüttwitz served as the soul of resistance at the hotspots of the combat, and despite his soldiers’ exhaustion from the heavy combat of the previous weeks they succeeded in resisting the enemy onslaught.
In the Korps’ subsequent operations the enemy succeeded in breaking through the positions of the 84. Infanterie-Division (south of Nijmegen) following hours of preparatory artillery fire. They went on to enter into the Reichswald, and in response the XXXXVII. Panzer-Korps was dispatched to attack those enemy forces that were pushing east. General Freiherr von Lüttwitz launched a powerful counterattack in the midmorning hours of the 12.02.1945 that succeeded in intercepting the enemy’s blow and recapturing the eastern edge of the Reichswald. This success was of particular operational importance, as it prevented those friendly forces in the Cleve area from being cut off. General Freiherr von Lüttwitz thereby established the groundwork for the creation of a new front.
Later, on the 04.03.1945, the enemy achieved a deep and potentially decisive penetration in the sector of the left neighbouring Korps. In this situation, and although he was himself under heavy pressure, General Freiherr von Lüttwitz decided to pull out his 116. Panzer-Division from the frontline and offer it up to the Armee for employment towards the south and southwest. By doing this he provided the Armee with the means to deny the enemy the undamaged Rhine bridges at Homberg and Moers.
In the time period 11.02.-07.03.1945 the enemy suffered extremely high losses in the area of the XXXXVII. Panzer-Korps, including:
340 prisoners
287 tanks
30 armoured vehicles
16 anti-tank guns.
During these battles General Freiherr von Lüttwitz has stood out as an extremely brave and decisive leader of men. He has stood in the thick of the fighting without regard for his own safety. Undeterred by the enemy’s artillery fire or random air attacks, he was frequently (and more than was necessary) present at the forward command posts in order to acquire a more accurate picture of the battlefield. With omnipresent calm and lucidity, he made his decisions and intervened in the direct command of the fighting whenever the situation demanded it.”
157th Award.
Al requested documentation was dealt with and confirmed by the OKH/PA/P5.
His nomination was received by the Heerespersonalamt (HPA—Army Staff Office) on 28-4-1945. Major Joachim Domaschk decided on 30 April: "Heeresgruppe B, postpone!" General Von Lüttwiz, together with the remaining forces of the Heeresgruppe B, was declared missing in action in the Ruhr Pocket on 15 April. The nomination was thus not further processed in accordance with AHA 44 Ziff. 572. The nomination list for the higher grades of the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross also contains a note from 28-4-1945: "postponed". Thus a bestowal did not occur. The sequential number "157" and presentation date were assigned by the Association of Knight's Cross Recipients (OdR).