Mauss, Dr. med. dent., Karl
- Date of birth:
- May 17th, 1898 (Plön/Schleswig-Holstein, Germany)
- Date of death:
- February 9th, 1959 (Hamburg, Germany)
- Nationality:
- German
Biography
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1939 Spange zum Eisernes Kreuz 2er Klasse 1914
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Rank:
- Major
- Unit:
- Kommandeur II. / Infanterie-Regiment 69 (mot.) / 20.Infanteriedivision
- Awarded on:
- September 28th, 1939
Had already received the Iron Cross 2nd Class on September 16th 1915.
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Rank:
- Major
- Unit:
- Kommandeur II. / Infanterie-Regiment 69 (mot.) / 10.Panzer-Division
- Awarded on:
- May 25th, 1940
Had already received the Iron Cross 1st Class on October 21st 1916.
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Rank:
- Oberstleutnant (Lieutenant-colonel)
- Unit:
- Kommandeur, II. Bataillon, Schützen-Regiment 69, 10. Panzer-Division, Heer
- Awarded on:
- November 26th, 1941
694th Award
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Rank:
- Oberst (Colonel)
- Unit:
- Kommandeur, Panzergrenadier-Regiment 33, 4. Panzer-Division, Heer
- Awarded on:
- March 11th, 1943
Award 327/37
He is written in Patzwall / Scherzer as Mauss, Dr., Karl
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Rank:
- Oberst (Colonel)
- Unit:
- Kommandeur, Panzergrenadier-Regiment 33, 4. Panzer-Division, Heer
- Awarded on:
- November 24th, 1943
335th Award
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Rank:
- Oberst (Colonel)
- Unit:
- Kommandeur 7.Panzer-Division
- Awarded on:
- March 13th, 1944
During the heavy defensive battles of the past few days in the area east of Tarnopol, the first SS-Panzer-Division "Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler" under the deputy leadership of Obersturmbannführer Lehmann and the Thuringian 7th Panzer-Division under Colonel Dr. Mauss have proved themselves to be excellent.
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Rank:
- Generalmajor (Brigadier)
- Unit:
- Kommandeur 7.Panzer-Division
- Awarded on:
- August 15th, 1944
Due to the heroic resistance of the troops of this corps, with decisive participation of the 7th Panzer-Division under Major General Mauß, was the intended breakthrough in the area north of Tilsit prevented, and thus laid the foundation for a further successful defense of the East Prussian border.
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Rank:
- Generalmajor (Brigadier)
- Unit:
- Kommandeur, 7. Panzer-Division, Heer
- Awarded on:
- October 23rd, 1944
Awarded for his leadership of the 7. Panzer-Division in 1944. On the 23.03.1944 the Division was encircled at Satanowka. Dr. Mauss took control of a group of Panthers belonging to the 1. SS-Panzer Division, attacked towards the south and was able to make contact with the 1. Panzer-Armee. Later on the Division fought near Lida and in Lithuania, where it played a major role in hindering the Soviet advance towards Tilsit.
101st Award
101st Award
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Rank:
- Generalleutnant (Major-general)
- Unit:
- Kommandeur 7.Panzer-Division
- Awarded on:
- February 20th, 1945
In the heavy combat around Elbing, has with the Swords to the Oak Leaves of the Knight's Cross awarded commander of the 7th Panzer-Division, Lieutenant General Mauss, excelled through high personal bravery and determination. During an advance from Elbing to the west, he encouraged at the head of his division, himself fighting with the machine gun, by example his troops to great deeds.
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Rank:
- Generalleutnant (Major-general)
- Unit:
- Kommandeur, 7. Panzer-Division, Heer
- Awarded on:
- April 15th, 1945
Mauss’s Diamonds’ recommendation reads as follows…
“Since being awarded the Swords Generalleutnant Mauss has once again rendered a series of outstandingly brave feats. These have once again confirmed the outspoken leadership personality and military abilities a divisional commander who is imbued with exemplary aggressive spirit.
1.) Generalleutnant Mauss especially distinguished himself during the fierce defensive combat in Latvia and Lithuania in the time period 05.-10.10.1944. Although the Bolsheviks’ armoured wedges pushed forwards without regard for their high losses they were nevertheless repeatedly intercepted and smashed by the 7. Panzer-Division in a series of merciless tank battles (particularly in the Tryskiai-Telsche area in the time period 05.-07.10.1944 and south of Plunge on the 08.10.1944).
The brave divisional commander always led his unit from the foremost line, and through his example his exhausted men were inspired to give their utmost. The heroically fighting Division was able to destroy the bulk of the enemy tanks. This resulted in a decisive defensive success, as the intended Bolshevik breakthrough to East Prussia was prevented and Memel held. The flexible leadership and extraordinary personal bravery of Generalleutnant Mauss was decisive for this success.
2.) In the area of 2. Armee the bold and determined performance of Generalleutnant Mauss and his 7. Panzer-Division played a major role in the heroic combat around Elbing and the heavy defensive battles around Konitz (attachment 1).
Within the combat zone Marienburg-Elbing the fighting reached a pronounced level of ferocity during the course of the 26. & 27.01.1945. Here the enemy countered a friendly counterthrust by sending in more troops towards the northwest and by launching new attacks across the Nogat. This led to major penetrations north and northeast of Marienburg, and the land connection between Marienburg and Elbing was broken.
The enemy launched a deliberate envelopment attack against Elbing. Contact to the west was interdicted, and 15 tanks entered into the northern part of the city.
In this major crisis Generalleutnant Mauss immediately released elements of his Division (above all the Aufklärungs-Abteilung) towards the southeast in order to eliminate the penetrations at the Nogat bridgehead. At the same time he ordered the Pz.Gren.Rgt. 7 to move out from Einlage and restore the friendly security lines towards the east in the direction of Elbing. Ultimately the enemy were prevented from advancing any further out of the Nogat bridgehead or expanding their penetrations.
On the 28.01.1945 the Division’s Kampfgruppe Ehle moved out of Einlage eastwards in the direction of Elbing and southwards towards the Elbinger Territor in order to prevent the reinforced envelopment attacks against Elbing. These attacks (led by Generalleutnant Mauss with great prudence and determination) met with success. During the afternoon the land connection was restored with Elbing (attachment 2).
On the morning of the 31.01.1945 Generalleutnant Mauss led his Kampfgruppe Kempchen from Elbing towards the southeast. The Kampfgruppe pressed forwards through heavy artillery, tank and anti-tank bombardment as far as Meislatein, where the attack bogged down in a snowstorm before powerful elements of the 5th Tank Army. At this point Generalleutnant Mauss decided to swing northwards in order to once again bring the attack in motion. However high snowdrifts soon prevented any further advance in this area. The commander then decided to pivot towards the north and search for an advance route towards the east in the direction Mühlhausen—Schlobitten. Then the divisional commander learned that the enemy had broken through the lines west of Elbing with two regiments, and thereby severed land contact towards the west.
He therefore gave orders to cancel the thrust towards the east and instead move to clear the road Elbing—Einlage. After a short regrouping this was immediately prosecuted. The attack bogged down at a point 2 km west of Elbing in the face of the broken-in enemy and their massive Pakfront. Acting swiftly, Generalleutnant Mauss instead decided to conduct his breakthrough further north via the 5th cattle track.
At the spearhead of his Aufklärungs-Abteilung (where he personally fired an MG) he broke through the hostile positions and forged a path for the follow-up Kampfgruppe Kempchen (which was presently engaged in costly fighting against tough and bitterly defending enemy anti-tank guns and snipers). During the midday hours of the 01.02.1945 all elements of the Division were reunited in the Einlage area.
At around midnight that very same night the newly-reorganized Kampfgruppe Kempchen launched an attack along the 3rd cattle track in order to restore the old frontline. However despite two attempts the attack bogged down before a strong Pakfront in terrain that was totally flat and criss-crossed by numerous ditches. A penetration was only achieved on the left wing. Following days of fierce combat (which saw every bush and house contested) the Division slowly shifted its main effort towards the north, and it eventually reached the Kraffohlsdorf area. About 100 wounded were rescued from Elbing. The enemy continuously brought up reinforcements, and they interfered with friendly intentions by launching their own attacks with strong artillery and mortar support.
On the 06.02.1945 Generalleutnant Mauss assembled all available forces and meticulously prepared them for the relief attack towards Elbing. The main thrust would be on the left wing, while other forces would provide flank protection towards the southwest. At the same time the city garrison was authorized to launch their own attack towards the north and northwest in order to make contact with the relief forces. In light of the fact that large elements of the civilian population together with a large number of heavily wounded men were being pressed into an ever smaller area of the city (and without water no less), Generalleutnant Mauss ordered two Kampfgruppen to launch a concentrated thrust against Elbing from the north and northwest.
Due to low-lying cloud cover the requested Stuka squadrons were unable to give our ground troops the desired support. The enemy countered our offensive formation coming from the north with their own massive attacks from the south and west. There was a dearth of friendly weaponry, however our troops were supported by well-laid fire from the heavy cruiser ‘Lützow’. With this support the commander and his troops finally reached the city’s edge in the morning hours of the 10.02.1945, and contact with the Elbing garrison was established. Generalleutnant Mauss thereby relieved the garrison of Elbing, a force of 1900 men commanded by Oberst Schöpffer. It was thus possible to evacuate about 1200 wounded.
In this bitter combat around Elbing the divisional commander demonstrated great responsibility, decisiveness and personal bravery. He decisively contributed to preventing the hostile thrust towards Danzig as well as the relief of the hard-pressed garrison at Elbing (attachment 4).
3.) On the 12.02.1945 the enemy succeeded in breaking through our thinly-spread frontline east of Kamin with strong tank/infantry forces of their own.
At the time the 7. Panzer-Division was still in the area northwest of Elbing, and it received orders to transfer to the area east of Konitz in order to intercept the enemy attempt to thrust through the city towards the west, north and northeast. The enemy had to be stopped from achieving a breakthrough at all costs.
The enemy had already reached the southern and southeastern edge of Konitz, and by swinging west they had also already crossed the road to Schlochau. Enemy recon probes were reported to be just west of the Konitz—Berent road. To the southeast of the city the enemy were also advancing towards the city in a NNE direction with tanks and infantry in order to cross the Konitz—Pr. Stargard road and secure the road to Berent. The enemy were thus on the brink of achieving an uncontested breakthrough towards Bütow and Berent.
In this situation the divisional commander decided to use the Aufklärungs-Abteilung to launch a flank attack into those hostile armoured elements in the area west of Paglau in order to halt their advance towards the north. After stronger friendly elements had arrived he would use them to draw off the enemy forces that were bypassing Konitz to the west. The attack of the Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung (which carried on into the night) produced the intended result. The enemy were intercepted before reaching the Konitz—Tuchel road and pushed back towards the west. They were also forced to detach strong forces from the area west of Konitz in order to guard their eastern flank. Any further hostile thrust towards Bütow was thus temporarily averted.
Those enemy forces west of Paglau were tied down before the front of the Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung. With this achieved the divisional commander decided to make a new move in the late afternoon despite the potential flank threat from those hostile forces on the southern edge of Konitz. He personally led the two SPW Kompanien of Pz.Gr.Rgt. 6 towards the northeast in order to block the road to Berent and clear the area north of Konitz. With this the enemy was also prevented from advancing to Berent by the weak elements of the Division which were available at the time (attachment 5).
On the night of the 13./14.02.1945 an tactical group was assembled in Neuamerika from newly arrived elements of the Panzer-Regiment. The plan was for this armoured group to secure the area northwest and west of Konitz of the enemy. They would be protected towards the south by the Aufklärungs-Abteilung (which would launch its own supporting attack) and towards the north by the weak elements of Pz.Gren.Rgt. 6 that were available. While the armoured group did manage to eliminate strong enemy infantry and anti-tank gun forces northwest of Konitz during the morning hours of the 14.02.1945, the enemy simultaneously entered into Konitz from the west and southeast with tanks and infantry. They pushed back the city’s garrison into the barracks district (located in the eastern part of Konitz).
In this critical situation the divisional commander swiftly pivoted his armoured group southwards towards the Schlochau—Konitz road. He ordered it to engage those enemy forces in the city by striking their rear area from the west. The hostile elements that had penetrated friendly lines from the south and southeast were also to be eliminated.
Numerous enemy tanks were destroyed in the city centre following bitter urban combat against a much larger opposing force. An armoured group that had penetrated into the southeastern portion of the city was destroyed, and the Russian infantry were thrown back to the city’s edge. The enemy were so weakened by their losses in men and materiel that they were prevented from achieving their intended breakthrough towards the north via Konitz.
During the 15.02.1945 the divisional commander reinforced the defenses of the roads leading out of Konitz towards the northeast and north. Elements of the SPW Bataillon were deployed to reestablish control over a road fork located 4 km northwest of Konitz (north of Niesewanz) and simultaneously eliminate those enemy infantry that had occupied the fork in the interim together with their strong anti-tank gun defenses. With this the enemy’s path to Bütow was also blocked.
The flexible, determined and skillful leadership of the divisional commander achieved a highly desirable result. With only the handful of available elements of the Division, he had prevented the numerically superior enemy from achieving a breakthrough via Konitz in a battle that saw 34 enemy tanks (mostly of the heavy class) and 24 guns/anti-tank guns being destroyed.
This most recent battlefield victory of the 7. Panzer-Division is above all attributable to the determined and confident divisional commander. Whilst leading at the spearheads of his unit he demonstrated the resolve that was necessary to master crisis situations. Furthermore he consistently demonstrated the drive of an aggressive commander, and this motivated his men to act heroically in combat. He did not spare himself any quarter either, and ultimately he proved capable of inflicting crushing blows on the foe and preventing their sought-after operational breakthrough.
I therefore recommend the brave commander of the 7. Panzer-Division, Generalleutnant Mauss, for the award of the Oakleaves with Swords and Diamonds to the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross.”
General von Kessel (of the VII. Panzer-Korps) later wrote a follow-up document to this initial recommendation…
“Following the recommendation for the award of the Knight’s Cross with Oakleaves, Swords & Diamonds that the A.O.K. 2 submitted for Generalleutnant Mauss (commander of the 7. Panzer-Division) on the 03.03.1945… the A.O.K. 2 is now submitting additional information in support of the recommendation:
1.) The Bolsheviks achieved a major breakthrough towards the northwest from the direction of Pr. Friedland, and in response the [7. Panzer] Division was relocated from the Konitz area to the Rummelsburg area on the 28.02.1945 in order to contain the hostile assault formation from the northeast. Over the course of days of fierce offensive and defensive combat (fought primarily in the forest) the Division distinguished itself anew under the leadership of Generalleutnant Mauss. The General never departed the ranks of his actively engaged Regiments and soldiers, and his example at the frontline inspired his men to give their utmost. It was only this conduct that enabled the battle-weary Panzer-Division to present an unbreakable obstacle to any hostile thrust towards the east. Generalleutnant Mauss proved to be capable of repeatedly bringing the foe to battle (in terrain that was especially unsuitable for motorized forces no less) and inflicting heavy losses upon them.
2.) On the 08.03.1945 the Division was ordered to retreat to the northeast, however at the time it only had enough fuel to move the entire Division back a distance of 15 km. In this situation the skillful and flexible leadership of Generalleutnant Mauss managed to contain the hotly pursuing enemy long enough for the necessary fuel supplies to be brought up from the supply depots in Gotenhafen. It was only the outstanding abilities of the divisional commander which enabled the entire Division (including all its weapons, vehicles and equipment) to reach the Gotenhafen bridgehead on the 11.03.1945 following a series of arduous night marches. Generalleutnant Mauss demanded the utmost from every one of his troops, and his tough willpower resulted in a total success.
3.) The time period 12.-23.03.1945 saw a round of extremely fierce defensive combat for the Gotenhafen bridgehead. The Division was repeatedly employed in dense and ravine-covered terrain, and so it required experienced and flexible leadership in order to prevent any hostile infiltration. The Bolsheviks stormed against our positions on a daily basis with an extraordinary fierceness and employment of materiel. They succeeded in achieving penetrations here and there, however almost all of these were eliminated by energetically-led counterthrusts by the Division.
2 Infanterie-Divisionen were subordinated to Generalleutnant Mauss, and the enemy managed to penetrate their lines thanks to their own numerical superiority. However Generalleutnant Mauss was able to intercept and seal off this thrust thanks to skillful employment of his mobile and armoured elements. The fighting which lasted day and night was extremely costly for both sides, however the Kampfgruppe was able to prevent any deep penetration by the enemy. The Division only pulled back to the smaller Oxhöfter Kämpe bridgehead after the enemy had reached the Baltic Sea following an advance via Groß-Katz (located in the neighbouring sector). This split up the Danzig-Gotenhafen bridgehead and brought the foe to the southern edge of Gotenhafen.
4.) On the 24.03.1945 work began to improve the defenses of the Oxhöfter Kämpe bridgehead. However for their part the enemy began piling pressure onto the bridgehead from the very beginning, and over the course of many weeks of combat the Grenadiers received no rest. The 7. Panzer-Division once again found itself in the thick of the action, and under the command of Generalleutnant Mauss it managed to either repulse or counterattack these onslaughts every time. On the 25.03.1945 Generalleutnant Mauss was badly wounded by artillery splinters in both of his legs and his head whilst driving up to confer with one of his defending Regiments. His injuries led to the amputation of his left leg.”
26th Award
“Since being awarded the Swords Generalleutnant Mauss has once again rendered a series of outstandingly brave feats. These have once again confirmed the outspoken leadership personality and military abilities a divisional commander who is imbued with exemplary aggressive spirit.
1.) Generalleutnant Mauss especially distinguished himself during the fierce defensive combat in Latvia and Lithuania in the time period 05.-10.10.1944. Although the Bolsheviks’ armoured wedges pushed forwards without regard for their high losses they were nevertheless repeatedly intercepted and smashed by the 7. Panzer-Division in a series of merciless tank battles (particularly in the Tryskiai-Telsche area in the time period 05.-07.10.1944 and south of Plunge on the 08.10.1944).
The brave divisional commander always led his unit from the foremost line, and through his example his exhausted men were inspired to give their utmost. The heroically fighting Division was able to destroy the bulk of the enemy tanks. This resulted in a decisive defensive success, as the intended Bolshevik breakthrough to East Prussia was prevented and Memel held. The flexible leadership and extraordinary personal bravery of Generalleutnant Mauss was decisive for this success.
2.) In the area of 2. Armee the bold and determined performance of Generalleutnant Mauss and his 7. Panzer-Division played a major role in the heroic combat around Elbing and the heavy defensive battles around Konitz (attachment 1).
Within the combat zone Marienburg-Elbing the fighting reached a pronounced level of ferocity during the course of the 26. & 27.01.1945. Here the enemy countered a friendly counterthrust by sending in more troops towards the northwest and by launching new attacks across the Nogat. This led to major penetrations north and northeast of Marienburg, and the land connection between Marienburg and Elbing was broken.
The enemy launched a deliberate envelopment attack against Elbing. Contact to the west was interdicted, and 15 tanks entered into the northern part of the city.
In this major crisis Generalleutnant Mauss immediately released elements of his Division (above all the Aufklärungs-Abteilung) towards the southeast in order to eliminate the penetrations at the Nogat bridgehead. At the same time he ordered the Pz.Gren.Rgt. 7 to move out from Einlage and restore the friendly security lines towards the east in the direction of Elbing. Ultimately the enemy were prevented from advancing any further out of the Nogat bridgehead or expanding their penetrations.
On the 28.01.1945 the Division’s Kampfgruppe Ehle moved out of Einlage eastwards in the direction of Elbing and southwards towards the Elbinger Territor in order to prevent the reinforced envelopment attacks against Elbing. These attacks (led by Generalleutnant Mauss with great prudence and determination) met with success. During the afternoon the land connection was restored with Elbing (attachment 2).
On the morning of the 31.01.1945 Generalleutnant Mauss led his Kampfgruppe Kempchen from Elbing towards the southeast. The Kampfgruppe pressed forwards through heavy artillery, tank and anti-tank bombardment as far as Meislatein, where the attack bogged down in a snowstorm before powerful elements of the 5th Tank Army. At this point Generalleutnant Mauss decided to swing northwards in order to once again bring the attack in motion. However high snowdrifts soon prevented any further advance in this area. The commander then decided to pivot towards the north and search for an advance route towards the east in the direction Mühlhausen—Schlobitten. Then the divisional commander learned that the enemy had broken through the lines west of Elbing with two regiments, and thereby severed land contact towards the west.
He therefore gave orders to cancel the thrust towards the east and instead move to clear the road Elbing—Einlage. After a short regrouping this was immediately prosecuted. The attack bogged down at a point 2 km west of Elbing in the face of the broken-in enemy and their massive Pakfront. Acting swiftly, Generalleutnant Mauss instead decided to conduct his breakthrough further north via the 5th cattle track.
At the spearhead of his Aufklärungs-Abteilung (where he personally fired an MG) he broke through the hostile positions and forged a path for the follow-up Kampfgruppe Kempchen (which was presently engaged in costly fighting against tough and bitterly defending enemy anti-tank guns and snipers). During the midday hours of the 01.02.1945 all elements of the Division were reunited in the Einlage area.
At around midnight that very same night the newly-reorganized Kampfgruppe Kempchen launched an attack along the 3rd cattle track in order to restore the old frontline. However despite two attempts the attack bogged down before a strong Pakfront in terrain that was totally flat and criss-crossed by numerous ditches. A penetration was only achieved on the left wing. Following days of fierce combat (which saw every bush and house contested) the Division slowly shifted its main effort towards the north, and it eventually reached the Kraffohlsdorf area. About 100 wounded were rescued from Elbing. The enemy continuously brought up reinforcements, and they interfered with friendly intentions by launching their own attacks with strong artillery and mortar support.
On the 06.02.1945 Generalleutnant Mauss assembled all available forces and meticulously prepared them for the relief attack towards Elbing. The main thrust would be on the left wing, while other forces would provide flank protection towards the southwest. At the same time the city garrison was authorized to launch their own attack towards the north and northwest in order to make contact with the relief forces. In light of the fact that large elements of the civilian population together with a large number of heavily wounded men were being pressed into an ever smaller area of the city (and without water no less), Generalleutnant Mauss ordered two Kampfgruppen to launch a concentrated thrust against Elbing from the north and northwest.
Due to low-lying cloud cover the requested Stuka squadrons were unable to give our ground troops the desired support. The enemy countered our offensive formation coming from the north with their own massive attacks from the south and west. There was a dearth of friendly weaponry, however our troops were supported by well-laid fire from the heavy cruiser ‘Lützow’. With this support the commander and his troops finally reached the city’s edge in the morning hours of the 10.02.1945, and contact with the Elbing garrison was established. Generalleutnant Mauss thereby relieved the garrison of Elbing, a force of 1900 men commanded by Oberst Schöpffer. It was thus possible to evacuate about 1200 wounded.
In this bitter combat around Elbing the divisional commander demonstrated great responsibility, decisiveness and personal bravery. He decisively contributed to preventing the hostile thrust towards Danzig as well as the relief of the hard-pressed garrison at Elbing (attachment 4).
3.) On the 12.02.1945 the enemy succeeded in breaking through our thinly-spread frontline east of Kamin with strong tank/infantry forces of their own.
At the time the 7. Panzer-Division was still in the area northwest of Elbing, and it received orders to transfer to the area east of Konitz in order to intercept the enemy attempt to thrust through the city towards the west, north and northeast. The enemy had to be stopped from achieving a breakthrough at all costs.
The enemy had already reached the southern and southeastern edge of Konitz, and by swinging west they had also already crossed the road to Schlochau. Enemy recon probes were reported to be just west of the Konitz—Berent road. To the southeast of the city the enemy were also advancing towards the city in a NNE direction with tanks and infantry in order to cross the Konitz—Pr. Stargard road and secure the road to Berent. The enemy were thus on the brink of achieving an uncontested breakthrough towards Bütow and Berent.
In this situation the divisional commander decided to use the Aufklärungs-Abteilung to launch a flank attack into those hostile armoured elements in the area west of Paglau in order to halt their advance towards the north. After stronger friendly elements had arrived he would use them to draw off the enemy forces that were bypassing Konitz to the west. The attack of the Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung (which carried on into the night) produced the intended result. The enemy were intercepted before reaching the Konitz—Tuchel road and pushed back towards the west. They were also forced to detach strong forces from the area west of Konitz in order to guard their eastern flank. Any further hostile thrust towards Bütow was thus temporarily averted.
Those enemy forces west of Paglau were tied down before the front of the Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung. With this achieved the divisional commander decided to make a new move in the late afternoon despite the potential flank threat from those hostile forces on the southern edge of Konitz. He personally led the two SPW Kompanien of Pz.Gr.Rgt. 6 towards the northeast in order to block the road to Berent and clear the area north of Konitz. With this the enemy was also prevented from advancing to Berent by the weak elements of the Division which were available at the time (attachment 5).
On the night of the 13./14.02.1945 an tactical group was assembled in Neuamerika from newly arrived elements of the Panzer-Regiment. The plan was for this armoured group to secure the area northwest and west of Konitz of the enemy. They would be protected towards the south by the Aufklärungs-Abteilung (which would launch its own supporting attack) and towards the north by the weak elements of Pz.Gren.Rgt. 6 that were available. While the armoured group did manage to eliminate strong enemy infantry and anti-tank gun forces northwest of Konitz during the morning hours of the 14.02.1945, the enemy simultaneously entered into Konitz from the west and southeast with tanks and infantry. They pushed back the city’s garrison into the barracks district (located in the eastern part of Konitz).
In this critical situation the divisional commander swiftly pivoted his armoured group southwards towards the Schlochau—Konitz road. He ordered it to engage those enemy forces in the city by striking their rear area from the west. The hostile elements that had penetrated friendly lines from the south and southeast were also to be eliminated.
Numerous enemy tanks were destroyed in the city centre following bitter urban combat against a much larger opposing force. An armoured group that had penetrated into the southeastern portion of the city was destroyed, and the Russian infantry were thrown back to the city’s edge. The enemy were so weakened by their losses in men and materiel that they were prevented from achieving their intended breakthrough towards the north via Konitz.
During the 15.02.1945 the divisional commander reinforced the defenses of the roads leading out of Konitz towards the northeast and north. Elements of the SPW Bataillon were deployed to reestablish control over a road fork located 4 km northwest of Konitz (north of Niesewanz) and simultaneously eliminate those enemy infantry that had occupied the fork in the interim together with their strong anti-tank gun defenses. With this the enemy’s path to Bütow was also blocked.
The flexible, determined and skillful leadership of the divisional commander achieved a highly desirable result. With only the handful of available elements of the Division, he had prevented the numerically superior enemy from achieving a breakthrough via Konitz in a battle that saw 34 enemy tanks (mostly of the heavy class) and 24 guns/anti-tank guns being destroyed.
This most recent battlefield victory of the 7. Panzer-Division is above all attributable to the determined and confident divisional commander. Whilst leading at the spearheads of his unit he demonstrated the resolve that was necessary to master crisis situations. Furthermore he consistently demonstrated the drive of an aggressive commander, and this motivated his men to act heroically in combat. He did not spare himself any quarter either, and ultimately he proved capable of inflicting crushing blows on the foe and preventing their sought-after operational breakthrough.
I therefore recommend the brave commander of the 7. Panzer-Division, Generalleutnant Mauss, for the award of the Oakleaves with Swords and Diamonds to the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross.”
General von Kessel (of the VII. Panzer-Korps) later wrote a follow-up document to this initial recommendation…
“Following the recommendation for the award of the Knight’s Cross with Oakleaves, Swords & Diamonds that the A.O.K. 2 submitted for Generalleutnant Mauss (commander of the 7. Panzer-Division) on the 03.03.1945… the A.O.K. 2 is now submitting additional information in support of the recommendation:
1.) The Bolsheviks achieved a major breakthrough towards the northwest from the direction of Pr. Friedland, and in response the [7. Panzer] Division was relocated from the Konitz area to the Rummelsburg area on the 28.02.1945 in order to contain the hostile assault formation from the northeast. Over the course of days of fierce offensive and defensive combat (fought primarily in the forest) the Division distinguished itself anew under the leadership of Generalleutnant Mauss. The General never departed the ranks of his actively engaged Regiments and soldiers, and his example at the frontline inspired his men to give their utmost. It was only this conduct that enabled the battle-weary Panzer-Division to present an unbreakable obstacle to any hostile thrust towards the east. Generalleutnant Mauss proved to be capable of repeatedly bringing the foe to battle (in terrain that was especially unsuitable for motorized forces no less) and inflicting heavy losses upon them.
2.) On the 08.03.1945 the Division was ordered to retreat to the northeast, however at the time it only had enough fuel to move the entire Division back a distance of 15 km. In this situation the skillful and flexible leadership of Generalleutnant Mauss managed to contain the hotly pursuing enemy long enough for the necessary fuel supplies to be brought up from the supply depots in Gotenhafen. It was only the outstanding abilities of the divisional commander which enabled the entire Division (including all its weapons, vehicles and equipment) to reach the Gotenhafen bridgehead on the 11.03.1945 following a series of arduous night marches. Generalleutnant Mauss demanded the utmost from every one of his troops, and his tough willpower resulted in a total success.
3.) The time period 12.-23.03.1945 saw a round of extremely fierce defensive combat for the Gotenhafen bridgehead. The Division was repeatedly employed in dense and ravine-covered terrain, and so it required experienced and flexible leadership in order to prevent any hostile infiltration. The Bolsheviks stormed against our positions on a daily basis with an extraordinary fierceness and employment of materiel. They succeeded in achieving penetrations here and there, however almost all of these were eliminated by energetically-led counterthrusts by the Division.
2 Infanterie-Divisionen were subordinated to Generalleutnant Mauss, and the enemy managed to penetrate their lines thanks to their own numerical superiority. However Generalleutnant Mauss was able to intercept and seal off this thrust thanks to skillful employment of his mobile and armoured elements. The fighting which lasted day and night was extremely costly for both sides, however the Kampfgruppe was able to prevent any deep penetration by the enemy. The Division only pulled back to the smaller Oxhöfter Kämpe bridgehead after the enemy had reached the Baltic Sea following an advance via Groß-Katz (located in the neighbouring sector). This split up the Danzig-Gotenhafen bridgehead and brought the foe to the southern edge of Gotenhafen.
4.) On the 24.03.1945 work began to improve the defenses of the Oxhöfter Kämpe bridgehead. However for their part the enemy began piling pressure onto the bridgehead from the very beginning, and over the course of many weeks of combat the Grenadiers received no rest. The 7. Panzer-Division once again found itself in the thick of the action, and under the command of Generalleutnant Mauss it managed to either repulse or counterattack these onslaughts every time. On the 25.03.1945 Generalleutnant Mauss was badly wounded by artillery splinters in both of his legs and his head whilst driving up to confer with one of his defending Regiments. His injuries led to the amputation of his left leg.”
26th Award
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
- Period:
- Second World War (1939-1945)
Sources
- Photo 1: Wilco Vermeer/Willi Schumacher collection
- Photo: Wilco Vermeer, Netherlands
- Willi Schumacher Collection, Colour Photo - - FELLGIEBEL, W.P., Elite of theThird Reich, Helion & Company Limited, Solihull, 2003.
- PATZWALL, K. & SCHERZER, V., Das Deutsche Kreuz 1941-1945, Verlag Klaus D. Patzwall, Norderstedt, 2001.
- THOMAS, FRANZ & WEGMANN, GÜNTER, Die Eichenlaubträger 1940-1945, Biblio-Verlag, 1998.
- Kwasny A., Kwasny G., Die Eichenlaubträger 1940-1945 (CD), Deutsches Wehrkundearchiv, Lage-Waddenhausen, 2001
- The wehrmacht at war 1939-1945 the units and commanders, Andris J. Kursietis ISBN 907532338-7
- Williamson, G., Knight's Cross with Diamonds Recipients, Osprey Publishing Ltd., Great Britain, 2006
- Helden der Wehrmacht, Sammelband (Miscellany), FZ-Verlag GmbH, München, Deutschland, 2000
- Berger, F., Mit Eichenlaub und Schwertern – Die höchstdekorierten Soldaten des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Selbstverlag Florian Berger, Wien, Österreich, 2002/03
- Federl, C., Die Ritterkreuzträger der Deutschen Panzerdivisionen 1939-1945, VDM Heinz Nickel, Zweibrücken, Germany, 2000
- Manteuffel, von H., Die 7. Panzer-Division – Bewaffnung, Einsätze, Männer, Nebel Verlag GmbH, Eggolsheim, Deutschland, 2001
- Axis Biographical Research
- das-ritterkreuz.de
- BArch RH 7/337
Photo
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