Period:

First World War (1914-1918)

Awarded on:

September 7th, 1914

Period:

First World War (1914-1918)

Awarded on:

February 17th, 1915

other sources give 03.02.1915

Period:

First World War (1914-1918)

Awarded on:

1917

with war decoration

Period:

First World War (1914-1918)

Awarded on:

April 25th, 1918

with swords

Period:

First World War (1914-1918)

Awarded on:

1918

Nr. 17 or 42

Rank:

Inspekteur des Seesports der SA

Awarded on:

1934

Awarded on:

February 1934

Awarded on:

1937

Period:

First World War (1914-1918)

Awarded on:

1938

Period:

First World War (1914-1918)

Awarded on:

1938

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

1939

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

1939

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

January 30th, 1939

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

May 1939

with star

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

1940

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Rank:

Grande Ufficiale

Awarded on:

January 1940

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

1940

with star and war decoration

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

April 20th, 1942

other sources give 00.05.1942

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

April 20th, 1942

other sources give 00.05.1942

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

August 2nd, 1943

other sources give 00.07.1943

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

May 15th, 1944

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Rank:

SS-Obergruppenführer / General der Waffen-SS und Polizei (Lieutenant-General)

Unit:

Kommandeur, 6. SS-Gebirgs-Division "Nord"

Awarded on:

October 22nd, 1944

Krüger’s Knight’s Cross recommendation reads as follows…

“On the 23.05.1944 SS-Obergruppenführer and General der Waffen-SS und Polizei, Friedrich-Wilhelm Krüger, took over command of the 6. SS-Geb.Division ‘Nord’. At the time it was positioned in the Louchi sector (Karelia) and subordinated to the XVIII. (Geb.) Armee-Korps, itself part of the 20. (Geb.) Armee.

Enemy Intentions:

On the 25.06.1944 the enemy commenced an attack against the north wing of the Division with 3 divisions of their own. After taking the northernmost friendly strongpoints, their goal was to thrust into the deep flank of the Division via the Jeletjosero—Ssennosero isthmus. By taking control of the Okunjewa-guba area they would reach the friendly road leading to the south. By following this road south to the crossroads at Kiestinki the enemy would block only available supply route in this area, and thereby cut off both divisions emplaced in the Louchi sector (6. SS-Geb.Division ‘Nord’ and the Divisions-Gruppe ‘Kräutler’) from their supply base.

Over the course of this offensive the danger would also exist that Russian forces north of Ssennosero would launch a wide-ranging thrust towards the northern bank of the Pja lake and take control of this area (which was only defended by a Finnish air-defense company). With this the enemy would take control of a good road that led towards Kuusamo, which lay in the rear area of the Armee. Kuusamo was also the nodal point for the supply of the XVIII. Korps.

At the same time it was also expected that the enemy would also launch frontal attacks with tank support in the area ‘Road of the SS’ and the south wing of the SS-Geb.Jäg.Rgt. 12 ‘MG’, so as to create additional points of attack.

Course of the Combat:

The enemy launched a surprise thrust with overwhelming forces on the 27.06.1944, which led to the capture of both northernmost friendly strongpoints. As an immediate countermeasure the SS-Aufkl.Abt. (mot) 6 (with 3 Kompanien) was dispatched to the Kapanez Lake—Ssennosero land bridge. The Abteilung managed to hold up the enemy here while inflicting heavy losses until additional friendly forces were freed up. High command had attached the Jäger-Bataillon 6 (Heer) to the Division. Only at great personal cost was the Obergruppenführer able to get the Bataillon (which was over-cautiously and shiftlessly led) to the ordered area so as to block the Jeletjosero—Ssennosero isthmus.

In order to deal with the second danger (an enemy thrust north of Ssennosero in the direction of the Pja lake), the Obergruppenführer immediately dispatched the SS-Schützen-Bataillon (mot) 6 along with the subordinated Ski-Bataillon 82 (Heer) to the area around the village of Ssennosero. Assembled into Kampfgruppe Lapp, the mission of these units was to block the corner at Blaupunkt 301. At the same time the Obergruppenführer took a heavily weakened Jäger-Bataillon from the main frontline and prepared it to attack the reinforced enemy located in the Jeletjosero—Ssennosero area.

Attacking with 2 Bataillonen on the 02.07.1944, and with 3 on the 06.07.1944, our forces succeeded in inflicting such heavy losses on the much numerically superior enemy that they were forced to give up their attempt to breakthrough here and go over to defense. At the same time the enemy brought up strong forces (1 rifle regiment and 4 ski battalions) against the friendly Kampfgruppe around Ssennosero, which was disrupting their aims significantly. They encircled the Kampfgruppe, and sought to annihilate it with continual attacks supported by artillery. The Kampfgruppe held its ground for 16 days until finally being relieved, repelling all enemy attacks while inflicting heavy losses.

During these decisive hours the Obergruppenführer tirelessly remained by his fighting troops, never shying from marches through difficult terrain. Through fully committing himself to the action, either while in the attack or in the supply of the encircled Kampfgruppe, he ensured that all difficulties were overcome in the shortest possible time.

In order to relieve the friendly Kampfgruppe in the area around Ssennosero, the Division was given the Geb.Jäg.Brigade 139 (Heer) by high command. Foreseeing the friendly relief attack, the enemy set up for defense in the Ssennosero—Wikssosero isthmus. On the 14.07.1944 the Brigade 139 commenced an attack against the commanding Hill 150, however this attack miscarried. Despite the concerns of the brigade commander, the Obergruppenführer once again dispatched the Brigade for an attack after its units had reorganized. All while conducting continual leadership actions among the attacking troops, the Obergruppenführer and his men were able to finally take Hill 150 on the 16.07.1944. The attack succeeded only on account of the Obergruppenführer’s imposition of his unbending will on the brigade commander while on the spot.

After this opening success the Brigade once again stalled with its 3 Bataillonen side by side, its front facing the northwest along the bank of the western land projection into the Ssennosero lake. At the time they could not find the energy to reach Ssennosero itself or push the enemy towards the north. Only after it had been goaded to attack by the divisional commander was the encircled Kampfgruppe (with its last available units in the line) finally freed and the enemy driven away in disorder. With this the relief of the friendly Kampfgruppe was completed, and the enemy objective of thrusting to the south or west via Ssennosero came to naught.

Decisive Deeds:

1. Stopping the enemy thrust along the Jeletjosero—Ssennosero isthmus.

2. Forcing the attack against Hill 150 despite the reservations of the Brigade commander.

3. Pushing the Brigade 139 forwards through a narrow corridor along the bank of the Ssennosero Lake so as to reach the village of Sssennosero.

Contributions as a Leader:

1. Swiftly bringing up friendly forces to the Jeletjosero—Ssennosero isthmus by ruthlessly stripping forces from quiet frontline sections. Immediately commencing attacks against the enemy (who were themselves preparing to attack) that inflicted such heavy losses so as to make the foe no longer in a position to mount an attack in this area. By doing this it was once again possible to free up new forces for immediate employment in other frontline sections.

2. The timely deployment of Kampfgruppe Lapp to the area around the village of Ssennosero, which extensively disrupted the enemy objectives.

3. Ensuring the resupply of the encircled Kampfgruppe via air and water in the face of strong enemy activity.

4. Gathering together all forces (via ruthlessly combing the supply and logistics troops) for road construction, in the knowledge that a well-built road network was essential for a successful prosecution of battle in terrain dominated by thick forests and swampland.

5. Being crisis-proof, decisive, unbothered by the great enemy numerical superiority and confident in the abilities of his Division. The Obergruppenführer managed to make a Division that had been engaged in static combat for 2 years into a formation that was both mentally and psychologically capable of engaging in mobile warfare, one which would follow him forwards into offensive actions. This was a decisive achievement.

Success:

Over the course of active combat, heavy losses were inflicted on the enemy. A hostile division was destroyed, and another heavily weakened. Through this the aim of the enemy to encircle the forces of the XVIII. (Geb.) Armee-Korps in the Louchi sector was thwarted. An enemy success here would have led to the collapse of the entire front in the Louchi sector, and made the pulling back of the front a doubtful proposition.

Enemy Losses:

2157 counted enemy dead
An estimated total of 3000 dead
An estimated total of 4000 wounded.”

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

1944

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

1944

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

1944

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)