Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Rank:

Major der Reserve (Major of Reserves)

Unit:

I. Bataillon, Grenadier-Regiment 411, 122. Infanterie-Division, Heer

Awarded on:

June 18th, 1943

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Rank:

Oberst (Colonel)

Unit:

Kommandeur, Grenadier-Regiment 410, 122. Infanterie-Division, Heer

Awarded on:

May 9th, 1945

Kliemann’s Knight’s Cross recommendation reads as follows…

“Oberst Kliemann has served with the Division without interruption since the 22.06.1941. Thanks to the bravery and resilience he has applied to all of his missions, as well as the tireless effort he has put forth on behalf of his men, he has managed to climb the ranks with surprising speed. Being only a Hauptmann and Kompanie commander on the 01.05.1941, he has since risen to the level of Oberst and regimental commander.

He is well-known as ’The Old Warrior’ of the Division. Both the leadership and his men view him with utter confidence, and despite the ever-changing combat situation he continues to exert an invaluable calming influence. He is the leader who, being the best of them all, is repeatedly sent to the most threatened sectors, and in every instance he has proven himself worthy of the trust bestowed upon him. He has already been named in the Army Honour Roll for the great bravery he demonstrated near Zaube (in Courland).

Following a renewed demonstration of excellence in the fighting south of Lake Svetainu (end of December 1944), he has more recently distinguished himself during the Fifth Battle of Courland in such a way that he is now considered worthy of being penned up for the award of the Knight’s Cross.

In this battle the Bolsheviks utilized their overwhelming superiority in men and materiel to full advantage, and after days of heavy fighting they succeeded in forcing a deep wedge into the friendly frontline southeast of Frauenburg (see Map 1).

By the 10.03.1945 the Bolsheviks had succeeded in reaching Lake Ciecere, and they began to use all available forces for an attempt to get around the northern and southern arms of the lake (via Broceni and Lemzere respectively).

While friendly reinforcements did arrive to help contain the enemy’s thrust to the north, Oberst Kliemann and his men stood all alone against the Bolshevik thrust towards the south. Furthermore, since he had already given up his II./Grenadier-Regiment 410 to assist the northern front, he only had the organic regimental units and I./Grenadier-Regiment 410 from his own Regiment available to combat the attacking Soviets. Aside from this his sector was also held by a Feld-Ersatz-Bataillon (composed of inexperienced replacements), an Alarm Pionier-Bataillon and a Sicherungs-Bataillon (see Map 2).

The situation was already quite tenuous on the 09.03.1945. The Bolsheviks penetrated on the left flank as far as Sausi, and by the end of the day the torn-up left flank was only held in a makeshift manner by security detachments (see Map 1).

On the 10.03.1945 the situation for the frontline around Lemzere became critical. The Bolsheviks advanced as far as Taurkalni, and reserves for closing the new frontline gap Sausi—Taurkalni were not available. The entire remainder of the Regimentsgruppe’s frontline was tied down by enemy attacks that themselves led to small penetrations (see Map 2).

Oberst Kliemann first issued orders for eliminating the smaller penetrations before personally rushing to the truly critical point, the open northern flank. He gathered up whatever stragglers he could find from the left neighbouring sector and used them to begin creating a blocking position via the establishment of two strongpoints near Taurkalni and Berznieki. However this was all that could be achieved with the forces at hand. The sector between Sausi and Berznieki could only be overmatched with patrols.

While conducting this emergency measure, Oberst Kliemann received word that the Bolsheviks had in the meantime succeeded in creating a broad penetration in the sector of Alarm-Bataillon Stegemann, located on the right wing. They had broken through into the rear area as far as Gerini and entered into the Brammani forest (see Map 2).

The crisis in Oberst Kliemann’s sector had thus entered its high point. Deep penetrations were present on both flanks (the one in the zone of the inexperienced Alarm Bataillon being especially serious), and the entire frontline being attacked at multiple locations and greatly thinned by losses. No reserves were available to combat the penetrations. The thought of pulling back to the line Lemzere—Gerini—Jaunzemji must have surely been present in the commander’s mind. However that kind of action was never his preference. Retreat was not an option.

He completed his measures for the security of the northern flank and issued his strongpoints clear guidelines for how to operate. He then rushed to his right flank and rounded up all available soldiers that could be found (primarily retreating men from the Alarm-Bataillon) before launching a counterthrust that drove back the Bolsheviks. The presence and inspiring example of the regimental commander brought courage to the inexperienced Baupionieren along the entire sector of frontline, and they succeeded in restoring the frontline with the exception of an inconsequential position at Reki.

At dusk the Bolsheviks renewed their attacks, especially in the left sector. Here they succeeded in infiltrating between the strongpoints. Oberst Kliemann immediately rushed forward and created a new security line. However the Bolsheviks, taking advantage of the night and the ever thinner friendly lines, were once again able to infiltrate through. However this new line was able to remain intact thanks to the tireless efforts of Oberst Kliemann. Rushing from outpost to outpost, he gave great courage to each individual man and personally intervened in the combat where it was necessary.

On the morning of the 11.03.1945 the enemy assembled a powerful collection of forces and, after a heavy artillery barrage, made another lunge towards Lemzere. They succeeded in pushing back the line and capturing the important hill near Lejeji.

Oberst Kliemann realized the importance of the enemy’s newfound control over this key hill, and so he personally launched a counterthrust against it with his last available reserve (consisting of splinter groups, messengers, drivers and signals troops). 4 Sturmgeschütze supported the counterthrust. The enemy, who had thought their victory secure, were caught totally off guard by this swift and violent response. They were thrown back off the hill while leaving behind 30 counted dead.

After this the front of the Regimentsgruppe continued to stand as a firm bulwark around Lemzere and the southern tip of Lake Ciecere. The Russians tried for days to reach the city of Frauenburg, however despite great expenditure of men and materiel they were unable to reach the city by getting around either the southern or northern tip of Lake Ciecere.

The heart and soul of the southern defence were provided by the brave regimental commander. In all this time he fought tirelessly at the hotspots of the combat, spared himself no concessions and refused any result other than victory. It was in this engagement that he became known as ‘The Lion of Lemzere’ to his soldiers.

To this day, Oberst Kliemann remains in the foremost salient of the entire Courland front (see Map 3).

The soldiers have long been awaiting and expecting the Knight’s Cross for Oberst Kliemann at some stage.

‘The independently-made decision’ is something that Oberst Kliemann has not previously received ample opportunity to effect to the extent that would merit him the award of the Knight’s Cross. In the past his mission was always to hold the position, and he did this tirelessly and while mastering every crisis situation in his characteristic manner.

His ability to withstand crises in the past has meant that alarming developments of the situation usually did not happen in the first place, and though he had to make many tactical decisions, none of them were of a singular and decisive nature that would be deemed sufficient for the award of the Knight’s Cross. More than this, his actions in the battle for Frauenburg were both outstanding, brave and delivered with an exceptional devotion to duty. His deeds here are surely on an equivalent level with an outstanding individual feat of decisiveness.

As the general opinion of all in the Division is now that: ‘He is the most deserving of it’, the time has undoubtedly come for Oberst Kliemann to be recommended for the Knight’s Cross.”


His nomination of the Heerespersonalamt (HPA—Army Staff Office) was ready for signature but the process was never completed. The Association of Knight's Cross Recipients (OdR) claims that the presentation was in accordance with the Dönitz-decree. This is illegal according to the Deutsche Dienststelle (WASt) and lacks legal justification. The presentation date was assigned by Walther-Peer Fellgiebel.

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Rank:

Oberst (Colonel)

Unit:

Kommandeur, Grenadier-Regiment 410, 122. Infanterie-Division, Heer

Awarded on:

December 27th, 1944

According to other source the awarding date is 7-1-1945.

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

May 31st, 1944

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

July 25th, 1942

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

September 30th, 1941

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

July 19th, 1940

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

September 23rd, 1939

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

December 10th, 1934

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

December 13th, 1918

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

March 30th, 1918

Period:

Second World War (1939-1945)

Awarded on:

June 5th, 1940